


# STORY BANDIA

# A TREND ANALYSIS FOR MIS/DISINFORMATION



# **FOREWORD**

Media monitoring is a key thematic area applied by ELOG in its work to ensure that the media adheres to ethical practice while covering electoral-related issues. Through media monitoring, ELOG identifies the incidences of misinformation, disinformation and hate speech to inform action by state and non-state actors. This is critical because only a well-informed citizenry and voting population can effectively participate in elections and related decision-making processes.

The "Story Bandia" trend analysis report represents a significant milestone in ELOG's ongoing efforts to deter the spread of hate speech, misinformation, and disinformation in the media. This report provides a comprehensive overview of the media landscape during the project's duration, highlighting key trends, challenges, and areas for improvement.

The findings and insights presented in the report underscore the critical importance of addressing hate speech, misinformation, and disinformation in the context of elections. As we continue to advocate for credible, free and fair, elections, it is paramount that we remain vigilant in countering these emerging threats to the democratic processess.

Moving forward, ELOG is committed to utilizing the findings from this project to inform advocacy efforts, policy recommendations, and capacity-building initiatives aimed at strengthening media literacy and responsible reporting. We firmly believe that by addressing these challenges, we can contribute to creating a society where elections are characterized by transparency, inclusivity, and the free exchange of information and ideas.



# **ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

The Elections Observation Group (ELOG) expresses profound gratitude for the collective effort and dedication that went into the successful execution of the "Story Bandia: An ELOG Trend Analysis of the Media for Misinformation and Disinformation" project. This initiative, which ran from October 2022 to August 2023, aimed to monitor and report on hate speech as well as misinformation and disinformation in the media landscape during this electoral period.

We acknowledge and express our appreciation to our partners and supporters who provided invaluable assistance and resources throughout the project. The National Endowment for Democracy (NED), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the European Union (EU) and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) offered unwavering support which enabled us to carry out this vital work.

We extend heartfelt appreciation to our team leader, Pauline Agesa, whose exceptional leadership, and unwavering commitment were instrumental in guiding the monitors deployed across select traditional and new media platforms. We also express our sincere gratitude to our Data Analyst, David Ian Okatch, who spearheaded the data analysis aspect of the project. David's meticulous approach to data collection, analysis, and interpretation greatly contributed to the depth and accuracy of our findings.

The success of this project would not have been realized without the diligent efforts of our monitors who worked tirelessly to monitor and document instances of hate speech, misinformation, and disinformation in the media. We acknowledge Asha Agenga, Beryl Oyieko, Beth Nkatha, Boaz Mugoto, Bosco Muthengi, Dennis Njonge, Dzan Kamene, Elizabeth Wambui, Fiona Achieng, Jamilla Osman, Hawa Mwaura, Gladys Chelang'at, Jane Naaba, Joyce Theuri, Lilian Mwasame, Redempta Kalee, Rozinah Amondi, Sharon Cheptoo, Silvia Mwathi, Veronica Kalii and William Onyango.

We acknowledge the support given by the Steering Committee through its Communications Committee chair Victor Nyongesa, the National Coordinator, Mulle Musau, the Senior Programs Officer, Marcus Ageng'a and the contribution of Program Officers, Shirly Amayo, and Hilda Mulandi. The finance and administration team, Susan Githu, Matilda Angunza, Nickson Mule, Josephine Muthoni and Evance Mureke ensured all required facilitation was taken care of. We appreciate them.

Regards

**ELOG** 

# INTRODUCTION

Elections Observation Group (ELOG) is a long-term and permanent citizen platform comprising of 18 Civil Society and Faith-Based Organizations with a mandate to strengthen democracy in Kenya and the African region through monitoring and observation of electoral processes. ELOG employs an electoral cycle approach which entails observation in the pre-election, during the election and the post-election environment. The approach informs wholesome observation and reporting of thematic and topical issues, tracking recommendations and providing updated and relevant information to the Kenyan citizens.

ELOG conducted a post-election media monitoring project which targeted **25 media outlets** between October 2022 and June 2023. The media monitoring focused on the coverage of ELOG's key thematic areas of electoral reforms, political party/coalition activities, participation of Special Interest Groups in electoral issues, activities by the Election Management Body, election petitions, and electoral/political violence. The monitors submitted a total of **5,020 quantitative reports** on the coverage of thematic areas and a total of **483 incidences** of misinformation, disinformation, and hate speech related to the thematic areas.

A trend analysis was conducted using the media monitoring reports to identify patterns of misinformation, disinformation and hate speech, activities that led to the occurrences, perpetrators, victims and occurrences per media platform. Among the key observable trend was the following 100% of the incidences of misinformation/disinformation and hate speech were reported from online platforms. Twitter was the leading purveyor at 42%, followed by Facebook at 32%, TikTok at 18% and Websites and Blogs at 8%.

The trend analysis looks at the different aspects of the reports, draws conclusions and predictions for future behaviour and concludes by giving recommendations on what state and non-state actors can do to address the issues raised.

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# **ABOUT THE MEDIA**

# **MONITORING PROJECT**

Media monitoring is an effective tool employed by Elections Observation Missions (EOMs) to provide the public with information on the performance of media in upholding the credibility of electoral processes. In recognition of this, ELOG employs media monitoring as one of the strategies to implement its observation mandate. The strategy focuses on misinformation, disinformation, and hate speech in the selected media outlets and informs mitigation by the relevant state and non-state actors.

The main objective of the media monitoring project was to assess the spread, degree, and substance of electoral-related hate speech, disinformation, and misinformation in Kenya during the 2022 post-electoral period.

Media Monitoring informs the larger ELOG mandate of safeguarding the integrity of Kenyan electoral processes through detection, flagging,

and informing citizens on the proliferation of mis/disinformation in the country.



During the post-election period, ELOG media monitors submitted a total of *5,020* quantitative reports and *483 incidences* of mis/disinformation from *25* observed media outlets between October 2022 and June 2023. The monitored media outlets are outline below.

	RADIO	TELEVISION	ONLINE	PRINT
1	Ramogi FM	NTV	Facebook	The Standard
2	Ghetto Radio	Citizen TV	Twitter	Nation
3	Spice FM	KBC TV	TikTok	Taifa Leo
4	Radio Citizen	Ramogi TV	Websites & Blogs	
5	Muuga FM	Inooro TV		
6	Kass FM			
7	KBC English service			
8	Athiani FM			
9	Mulembe FM		N VAZZIL	
10	Radio Jambo			
11	Sauti ya Pwani			W
12	Mbaitu FM			
13	Nyota FM			

# 2. CONTEXT SETTING: EFFECTS OF THE 2022 GENERAL **ELECTIONS RESULTS**



A number of events influenced political activities during the period that was being monitored. These included the following.

## **Election petitions**

After the declaration of William Ruto as the president-elect, 9 presidential petitions were filed at the Supreme Court in August 2022. A 7-judge bench chaired by the Chief Justice, Martha Koome heard and determined the petitions and in September, the judges unanimously dismissed the petitions and upheld the declaration of William Ruto as the president-elect.

The 2022 filing of petitions for the MCA and MP seats was conducted differently compared to the previous election petitions. Petitioners were required to file their cases on the e-platform after the migration of the judiciary operations to the online platforms. A total of 123 petitions were filed in High Court and Magistrate courts

across the country, 12 challenging the election of governors, 2 for the senators, 28 for Members of Parliament, 77 for Members of the County Assembly, and 4 for the women representatives. The petitions ended on 31st March 2023 and 9 elective seats were nullified, 2 for the members of parliament, 1 for the women representative, and 6 for the Members of the County Assembly.

# The IEBC split and the resultant transitions

In November 2022, four petitions were filed at the National Assembly seeking to remove the four commissioners who had walked out at the Bomas of Kenya, disowning the presidential results. The commission vice chair Juliana Cherera and commissioners Irene Masit, Justus Nyang'aya and Francis Wanderi, popularly known as the "Cherera four" were accused of gross misconduct, abuse of office, violation of the constitution and partisanship during the August 9th presidential race. Of the four, Wanderi, Cherera and Nyang'aya opted to resign from the commission rather than face the appointed investigating tribunal. Commissioner Irene Masit's (who chose to face the tribunal) contract was terminated in March 2023 through a gazette notice following the recommendation of the tribunal.

At the same time, the other three commissioners; Chair, Wafula Chebukati, Boya Molu and Prof. Abdi Guliye's, had their 6-year non-renewable term end on 17th January 2023. They subsequently proceeded to retire from office on this basis. A gazette notice was issued in February advertising 6 out of the 7 commission positions and the 7th was announced after the hearing and determination of Irene Masit's petition.

Earlier in January, the president signed the IEBC (Amendment) Bill 2022 into law allowing the formation of a seven-member selection panel to recruit new commissioners. The Selection Panel would be formed by representatives of the Parliamentary Service Commission (2 members), the Public Service Commission (PSC) (1 member), the Political Parties Liaison Committee (PPLC) (1 member), the Law Society of Kenya (LSK) (1 member), and the Inter-Religious Council of Kenya (2 members). In March 2023, the appointed (through parliament) selection panel advertised for and received 920 applications for the IEBC Commissioner positions. The shortlisting and interview activities were put on hold after a political agreement to conduct bipartisan talks between the government and the opposition on the reconstitution of the Selection Panel following rejection of the process by the latter

### **By-elections**

On 8th December 2022, IEBC conducted by-elections for the Bungoma Senatorial seat and for the County Assembly Representatives in Mumias North Ward (Kakamega County), South Gem Ward (Siaya County), Utawala Ward (Nairobi County), Kyome/Thaana Ward (Kitui County), and Ololmasani Ward (Narok County). The IEBC also conducted by-elections on 5th January 2023 for the Elgeyo Marakwet senatorial seat and the Member of Parliament seats for Garissa Township and Kandara Constituency.

The by-elections attracted the participation of the major political parties and coalitions, namely, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), FORD-Kenya, Wiper Party, Jubilee, the United Democratic Alliance (UDA), and Azimio La Umoja while persons who had not been nominated by the political parties opted to participate as independent candidates. The campaigns were extensively covered in the monitored media outlets and the use



of propaganda, fabricated ballot papers, disinformation on IEBC, and incidences of violence were observed and reported by the media monitors.

### **Demonstrations**

In February 2023, at a rally held at Kamukunji Grounds in Nairobi, Azimio la Umoja coalition leaders called for mass protests throughout the country demanding the opening of the IEBC servers, the reconstitution of the IEBC selection panel, and attendance to the high-cost of living. After a series of weekly protests held every Monday and Thursday, the president held a press conference in which he urged the opposition to cease the weekly demonstrations and participate in parliamentary bipartisan discussions to address some of the issues raised by the opposition.

On the same day, the opposition issued a press briefing agreeing to participate in the bipartisan talks and suspended the nationwide demonstrations pending the decisions from the talks. The Azimio la Umoja members and the Kenya Kwanza members met separately to select a 7-member-a-side committee to represent each coalition in the talks.

Differences arose from both coalitions regarding members selected for the committee. The opposition demanded the substitution of Adan Kaynan citing that he had been poached by the Kenya Kwanza Coalition from the opposition. Kaynan was later substituted with Dido Rasso in May a day after Azimio la Kwanza had resumed protests. By June, the government and opposition had not reached an agreement as the bipartisan talks collapsed.



# 3. METHODOLOGY


A desktop analysis was conducted based on media monitoring reports submitted by the 20 monitors covering 25 media outlets between October 2022 and June 2023. The monitors submitted 5,020 quantitative reports on the coverage of thematic areas by the selected media outlets. From the reports, a total of 483 incidences of misinformation/ disinformation and hate speech were flagged.

The trend report findings were analyzed based on different themes, including coverage of electoral thematic areas, activities around the incidences, types of mis/disinformation incidences, the key perpetrators and the victims of misinformation, disinformation and hate speech.




# 4. KEY ISSUES OBSERVED AND OBSERVABLE TRENDS

The trend analysis covered the following topical areas:




# a. Media Coverage of Thematic Areas in the Observed Outlets



### **ANALYSIS**


The monitors observed the coverage of six (6) thematic areas namely, Political Parties/coalitions activities, Electoral reforms, IEBC activities, election petitions, political/electoral violence, and the participation of Special Interest Groups (Women, youth, PWDs, and Marginalized Communities).

Out of the 5,020 quantitative reports submitted between October 2022 and June 2023, 1,962 (39%) reports were on the media's coverage of political party activities, 1,234 (25%) on media's coverage of IEBC activities, 978 (19%) on the coverage of electoral reforms, 528 (11%) on the coverage of election petitions, 263 (5%) on the coverage of the participation of Special Interest Groups in electoral matters, and 55 (1%) reported on media's coverage of electoral/political violence.




Of the 5,020 quantitative reports submitted by media monitors on coverage of electoral thematic areas, 1,618 (32%) reports were by online media, 1,510 (30%) reports were by radio, 1,426 (28%) reports were by TV and 466 (9%) reports were by print media.


### Breakdown of Electoral Thematic Area Coverage by the Media **Platforms**



Radio monitors submitted a total of *1,510* quantitative reports between October 2022 and June 2023. Political parties had *37%*, electoral reforms had *26%* of the coverage, IEBC activities had *24%*, and petitions had 10% while electoral/political violence had coverage of *1%* of radio coverage.



From the *5 TV outlets* observed between October 2022 and June 2023, a total of 1426 reports on the coverage of thematic areas were submitted. *40*% had covered political party activities, 26% IEBC activities, 15% electoral reforms, *10*% petitions, *7*% Special Interest Groups in electoral matters and 2% had coverage of electoral violence.



The print media monitor submitted a total of **466** reports between October 2022 and June 2023. Political/coalition activities were covered in 40% of the reports, IEBC activities had a coverage of **39**%, and petitions were covered in 11% of the reports, electoral reforms in **6%**, participations of SIGs in electoral issues in 3% and electoral/political violence in **1%** of TV coverage of the electoral thematic areas.

### **Findings on Coverage of Electoral Thematic Areas**

- $\sqrt{\ }$  The online platform had the highest number of reports at 1,618 while the print platform had the lowest number of reports, 466 on the coverage of the selected thematic issues
- √ Political party/coalition activities had the highest coverage in all the media platforms observed at 39%
- √ Electoral/political violence had the lowest coverage in all the media platforms observed with 1% in radio, online, and print and 2% coverage by TV
- √ The coverage of participation of Special Interest Groups in electoral issues had
  the second lowest coverage in all the media outlets. Online and TV platforms
  had a coverage of 7% each, print had a coverage of 3% while radio had a
  coverage of 2%
- √ Political party/coalition activities had the highest coverage on print, online and TV coverage (40% each) and 37% coverage by radio
- √ The IEBC activities had the highest coverage on the print outlets at 39% of print coverage of thematic issues, 26% of coverage by TV, 24% by Radio and 20% by online platforms
- √ Electoral reforms had the highest coverage on the radio at 26% of radio coverage of thematic issues, followed by Online at 21%, TV at 15%, and print at 6%
- $\sqrt{}$  Electoral petitions had the highest coverage of 11% on online platforms and print and had a coverage of 10% on radio and TV outlets

# **QUICK CONCLUSIONS**

The reports submitted showed a high coverage of political party/coalition activities across the media platforms at 39%, followed by IEBC activities at 25%, electoral reforms at 19%, petitions at 11%, the participation of SIGs at 5% and electoral/political violence at 1% especially during the demonstrations.

This resonates well with the fact that during this period, political party activity especially after the elections and during the parliamentary engagements over the fate of the IEBC commissioners held prominence in the country. The transitions at IEBC and the discussions around electoral reforms first as part of the election observation reports issued during the period and secondly as an agenda for the political demonstrations by Azimio Coalition also supported by the findings. It is clear therefore that the monitored platforms covered the main issues that were prevalent during the period.

According to the number of reports submitted, the online platform had the highest coverage of electoral thematic areas, (1,618 reports) compared to all the other media platforms (radio, TV and print). These findings suggest that online coverage of the area

of focus far superseded the other platforms. This speaks to a growing interest in digital and online media outlets given that the topics covered were the most prominent in the country during the period.


The findings also indicate that radio is still a more preferred outlet/platform for coverage of political events than either TV or print media thus justifying its versatility given the ever-changing media environment.

The coverage of IEBC activities on the print platform (39%) was the highest on all platforms. and thus people who read the newspapers within the observation period were more exposed to IEBC activities compared to the audiences who preferred to use online, TV, and radio platforms.

#### **RECOMMENDATIONS**

- 1. Media platforms need to employ a more disaggregated approach to coverage of electoral issues. This will enable the coverage of the participation of Special Interest Groups in the selected electoral thematic areas.
- 2. Given the increasing prominence of the use of online platforms to cover electoral issues, stakeholders need to prioritise their engagement with the medium.

# b. Incidences of Mis/Disinformation Flagged from the Observed Media Platforms



#### **ANALYSIS**

A total of 483 confirmed incidences of mis/disinformation and hate speech were reported across all the monitored outlets between October 2022 and June 2023. The incidences were limited to the identified electoral thematic areas.

Out of the online media outlets observed, Twitter had a total of 204 (42%) incidences, 155 (32%) incidences were reported from Facebook, 87 (18%) incidences were reported from TikTok (from 12 cases in the pre-election period) and 37 (8%) incidences were reported from websites and blogs.

#### **Findings**

- ➤ All incidences were reported from the online platform (Twitter, Facebook, TikTok, websites, and blogs). Other platforms (radio, TV and print) had no reported incidence.
- ➤ Twitter had the highest number of *incidences 42*%, followed by *Facebook at 32*%, *TikTok at 18*% and websites and blogs had the least at 8%.

# **QUICK CONCLUSION**

It is clear from the findings that online platforms were the main purveyors of misinformation, disinformation, and hate speech. This is a clear departure from the use of electronic media (radio and TV) which used to be the main medium through which disinformation and hate speech was spread in the previous electoral period (see ELOG Report 2017 elections).

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

- 1. Advocacy for sensitization on online disinformation on electoral issues should be included in the voter education curriculum
- 2. The Kenyan government should together with stakeholders develop robust laws to regulate online social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and TikTok in Kenya and compel the involved companies to tackle mis/disinformation on their platforms.

# Misinformation, Disinformation, and Hate Speech Incidences per Month



#### **FINDINGS**

- ➤ The highest number of incidences were reported in October, November, and December 2022 (72, 63, and 69 respectively) and March 2023 (57)
- ➤ The lowest number of incidences was reported in February (39)

### **QUICK CONCLUSION**

The highest number of incidences reported in October, November, and December 2022 were attributable to the campaigns for by-elections held on 8th December 2022 and 5th January 2023. The number of incidences reduced in January 2023 but was relatively high in comparison to the other months in 2023.


The lower number of incidences recorded in February was attributable to the lull in political activities and the reported number was attributable to election petitions and the constitution of the IEBC Selection Panel. A spike was recorded in March 2023, attributed to the anti-government protests and political parties/coalition activities that began in the month.

In April 2023, the number of activities had reduced to 43 from the 57 incidences reported in March. The decrease was attributable to the ending of the demonstrations and the start of bipartisan talks between the government and the opposition. An increase in incidences was reported in May 2023 and was attributable to the on-and-off nature of the bipartisan talks and debate on the Finance Bill 2023 that dominated headlines.

### **RECOMMENDATION**

i. Sensitization to be carried out on all media platforms to improve the citizens' understanding of topical issues which will help to reduce the occurrence of misinformation, disinformation and hate speech

### c. Activities that led to the Increase of Mis/Disinformation



#### **ANALYSIS**

During the observation period, the reported incidences were (where possible) categorized according to the activities that had occurred or were ongoing at the time of observation.

The highest number of incidences were reported during the demonstrations (106 incidences) followed by election petitions at 81, the Dec 2022 and Jan 2023 election campaigns at 72, and political rallies at 68. The lowest number of incidences were

reported during the IEBC activities at 28 and the Finance Bill 2023 at 24 incidences.

#### **FINDINGS**

- ➤ 22% of the incidences were reported during demonstrations
- ➤ 17% of incidences were reported during election petitions
- > 15% and 14% of the incidences were reported during the by-election campaigns and political rallies respectively
- ➤ 11% of the incidences were reported during the bipartisan talks
- ➤ 6% and 5% of the incidences were reported during the IEBC activities and the Finance Bill discussions respectively

# **QUICK CONCLUSION**


This highest number of incidences occurred during political activities such as demonstrations, petitions, and by-elections. It seems that political activities invite serious cases of mis/disinformation and hate speech.

Conversely, the lower number of incidences during the IEBC activities and the Finance Bill 2023 debate were attributed to sensitization, online public participation, and high coverage of the issues in the observed media platforms prior, during and after the actual activities.

#### RECOMMENDATION

Given that civic/voter education is a continuous activity in the country, it is imperative that the public in sensitized before the onset of major political activities such as demonstrations/picketing, election petitions and by-elections among others. This will reduce the misleading cases of mis/disinformation.

#### Forms of Mis/Disinformation Observed d.



#### **Observable Trends**

Misinformation and disinformation were generated and shared in different forms across the online media observed. Impersonation, where individuals created fake accounts using influential people or institutions' names, logos, and tags, was the commonly used form. This method was preferred by perpetrators because influential people and institutions, including media houses, are perceived to have a high influence on the online public and the general public.

#### **Fake accounts**










The use of old videos and pictures to depict a current situation was the second highest form used by perpetrators followed by the use of fake government and institutional documents and propaganda. Two hate speech incidences were recorded towards the end of the project with one targeting a media outlet and the other targeting a community.

### **Examples of the use of old Videos and Pictures to depict a current situation**







#### **Fake Government and Institutional Documents**







#### RECOMMENDATIONS

- ➤ Online media platforms should put in place stringent measures to curb fake/pseudo accounts that are used to perpetrate misinformation, disinformation and hate speech.
- ➤ Online platforms should partner with local organizations to help them identify what constitutes mis/disinformation and hate speech on a local/regional level other than the global.

# e. Perpetrators and Victims of Mis/Disinformation



#### **OBSERVABLE TRENDS**

Perpetrators of online mis/disinformation and hate speech were reported by media monitors (where applicable). From the reports, the general online public was recorded as the biggest perpetrator of online misinformation and disinformation with 282 incidences. In definition, the general online public referred to social media users not considered state officers, politicians, influential leaders and institutional heads, or social media influencers. Political and influential personalities were the second highest

perpetrators with a total of 54 incidences while social media influencers perpetrated 47 incidences.







#### **FINDINGS**

- ➤ 58% of the incidences were perpetrated by the general online public
- > 11% of incidences were perpetrated by political and influential personalities
- ➤ Social media influencers perpetrated 10% of the incidences while online bloggers and state officers perpetrated 8% and 7% of incidences respectively

#### a. Perpetrators and Victims of Mis/Disinformation Perpetrators of Mis/Disinfo and Hate Speech Others 31 **State Officers** 32 Online Bloggers The general online public Political/Influential personalities Social media influencers Λ 100 150 200 250 300 50

#### **Observable Trends**

Where possible, the media monitors indicated to whom the disinformation and hate speech were targeted. Regardless of who was the perpetrator, the largest number of incidences, 203 targeted the general online public, 58 incidences targeted political parties/coalitions, and 49 incidences targeted politicians and influential people while 42 incidences targeted women.







#### **FINDINGS**

- ➤ The general online public was targeted in 42% of the incidences
- ➤ Political parties/coalitions and politicians/ influential personalities were victims in 12% and 10% of the incidences respectively

### **QUICK CONCLUSIONS**

Both the above findings confirm that the general public (as social media users) are both the perpetrators as well as the victims of mis/disinformation. In respect to individuals politicians and influencers are responsible for a lot of the campaigns on this as the case of CS Moses Kuria that has been cited in the report indicates.

#### **RECOMMENDATIONS**

- 1. Legal action should be taken against perpetrators of mis/disinformation according to the "Computer Use and Cyber Crimes ACT 2018 and persecution of hate speech perpetrators under Article 33 (2) of the Kenyan 2010 Constitution.
- 2. The Kenyan government should together with stakeholders develop laws to regulate the operation of multinational companies such as Facebook and Twitter in Kenya and compel them to tackle mis/disinformation on their platforms
- 3. Political institutions such as Parties should censor members involved in cases on mis/disinformation and hate speech as part of their responsibility and due diligence.



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